Author: John Jay
To the People of the State of New York:
QUEEN ANNE, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch
Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of the
UNION then forming between England and Scotland, which merit our
attention. I shall present the public with one or two extracts
from it: ``An entire and perfect union will be the solid
foundation of lasting peace: It will secure your religion,
liberty, and property; remove the animosities amongst
yourselves, and the jealousies and differences betwixt our two
kingdoms. It must increase your strength, riches, and trade; and
by this union the whole island, being joined in affection and
free from all apprehensions of different interest, will be
ENABLED TO RESIST ALL ITS ENEMIES.'' ``We most earnestly
recommend to you calmness and unanimity in this great and
weighty affair, that the union may be brought to a happy
conclusion, being the only EFFECTUAL way to secure our present
and future happiness, and disappoint the designs of our and your
enemies, who will doubtless, on this occasion, USE THEIR UTMOST
ENDEAVORS TO PREVENT OR DELAY THIS UNION.''
It was remarked in the preceding paper, that weakness and
divisions at home would invite dangers from abroad; and that
nothing would tend more to secure us from them than union,
strength, and good government within ourselves. This subject is
copious and cannot easily be exhausted.
The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in
general the best acquainted, and it gives us many useful
lessons. We may profit by their experience without paying the
price which it cost them. Although it seems obvious to common
sense that the people of such an island should be but one
nation, yet we find that they were for ages divided into three,
and that those three were almost constantly embroiled in
quarrels and wars with one another. Notwithstanding their true
interest with respect to the continental nations was really the
same, yet by the arts and policy and practices of those nations,
their mutual jealousies were perpetually kept inflamed, and for
a long series of years they were far more inconvenient and
troublesome than they were useful and assisting to each other.
Should the people of America divide themselves into three or
four nations, would not the same thing happen? Would not similar
jealousies arise, and be in like manner cherished? Instead of
their being ``joined in affection'' and free from all
apprehension of different ``interests,'' envy and jealousy would
soon extinguish confidence and affection, and the partial
interests of each confederacy, instead of the general interests
of all America, would be the only objects of their policy and
pursuits. Hence, like most other BORDERING nations, they would
always be either involved in disputes and war, or live in the
constant apprehension of them.
The most sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies
cannot reasonably suppose that they would long remain exactly on
an equal footing in point of strength, even if it was possible
to form them so at first; but, admitting that to be practicable,
yet what human contrivance can secure the continuance of such
equality? Independent of those local circumstances which tend to
beget and increase power in one part and to impede its progress
in another, we must advert to the effects of that superior
policy and good management which would probably distinguish the
government of one above the rest, and by which their relative
equality in strength and consideration would be destroyed. For
it cannot be presumed that the same degree of sound policy,
prudence, and foresight would uniformly be observed by each of
these confederacies for a long succession of years.
Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen, and happen
it would, that any one of these nations or confederacies should
rise on the scale of political importance much above the degree
of her neighbors, that moment would those neighbors behold her
with envy and with fear. Both those passions would lead them to
countenance, if not to promote, whatever might promise to
diminish her importance; and would also restrain them from
measures calculated to advance or even to secure her prosperity.
Much time would not be necessary to enable her to discern these
unfriendly dispositions. She would soon begin, not only to lose
confidence in her neighbors, but also to feel a disposition
equally unfavorable to them. Distrust naturally creates
distrust, and by nothing is good-will and kind conduct more
speedily changed than by invidious jealousies and uncandid
imputations, whether expressed or implied.
The North is generally the region of strength, and many local
circumstances render it probable that the most Northern of the
proposed confederacies would, at a period not very distant, be
unquestionably more formidable than any of the others. No sooner
would this become evident than the NORTHERN HIVE would excite
the same ideas and sensations in the more southern parts of
America which it formerly did in the southern parts of Europe.
Nor does it appear to be a rash conjecture that its young swarms
might often be tempted to gather honey in the more blooming
fields and milder air of their luxurious and more delicate
neighbors.
They who well consider the history of similar divisions and
confederacies will find abundant reason to apprehend that those
in contemplation would in no other sense be neighbors than as
they would be borderers; that they would neither love nor trust
one another, but on the contrary would be a prey to discord,
jealousy, and mutual injuries; in short, that they would place
us exactly in the situations in which some nations doubtless
wish to see us, viz., FORMIDABLE ONLY TO EACH OTHER.
From these considerations it appears that those gentlemen are
greatly mistaken who suppose that alliances offensive and
defensive might be formed between these confederacies, and would
produce that combination and union of wills of arms and of
resources, which would be necessary to put and keep them in a
formidable state of defense against foreign enemies.
When did the independent states, into which Britain and Spain
were formerly divided, combine in such alliance, or unite their
forces against a foreign enemy? The proposed confederacies will
be DISTINCT NATIONS. Each of them would have its commerce with
foreigners to regulate by distinct treaties; and as their
productions and commodities are different and proper for
different markets, so would those treaties be essentially
different. Different commercial concerns must create different
interests, and of course different degrees of political
attachment to and connection with different foreign nations.
Hence it might and probably would happen that the foreign nation
with whom the SOUTHERN confederacy might be at war would be the
one with whom the NORTHERN confederacy would be the most
desirous of preserving peace and friendship. An alliance so
contrary to their immediate interest would not therefore be easy
to form, nor, if formed, would it be observed and fulfilled with
perfect good faith.
Nay, it is far more probable that in America, as in Europe,
neighboring nations, acting under the impulse of opposite
interests and unfriendly passions, would frequently be found
taking different sides. Considering our distance from Europe, it
would be more natural for these confederacies to apprehend
danger from one another than from distant nations, and therefore
that each of them should be more desirous to guard against the
others by the aid of foreign alliances, than to guard against
foreign dangers by alliances between themselves. And here let us
not forget how much more easy it is to receive foreign fleets
into our ports, and foreign armies into our country, than it is
to persuade or compel them to depart. How many conquests did the
Romans and others make in the characters of allies, and what
innovations did they under the same character introduce into the
governments of those whom they pretended to protect.
Let candid men judge, then, whether the division of America into
any given number of independent sovereignties would tend to
secure us against the hostilities and improper interference of
foreign nations.
PUBLIUS. |