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Federalist
No. 12
The Utility of the Union In
Respect to Revenue
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, November 27, 1787. |
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Author: Alexander Hamilton
To the People of the State of New York:
THE effects of Union upon the commercial prosperity of the
States have been sufficiently delineated. Its tendency to
promote the interests of revenue will be the subject of our
present inquiry.
The prosperity of commerce is now perceived and acknowledged by
all enlightened statesmen to be the most useful as well as the
most productive source of national wealth, and has accordingly
become a primary object of their political cares. By multipying
the means of gratification, by promoting the introduction and
circulation of the precious metals, those darling objects of
human avarice and enterprise, it serves to vivify and invigorate
the channels of industry, and to make them flow with greater
activity and copiousness. The assiduous merchant, the laborious
husbandman, the active mechanic, and the industrious
manufacturer,--all orders of men, look forward with eager
expectation and growing alacrity to this pleasing reward of
their toils. The often-agitated question between agriculture and
commerce has, from indubitable experience, received a decision
which has silenced the rivalship that once subsisted between
them, and has proved, to the satisfaction of their friends, that
their interests are intimately blended and interwoven. It has
been found in various countries that, in proportion as commerce
has flourished, land has risen in value. And how could it have
happened otherwise? Could that which procures a freer vent for
the products of the earth, which furnishes new incitements to
the cultivation of land, which is the most powerful instrument
in increasing the quantity of money in a state--could that, in
fine, which is the faithful handmaid of labor and industry, in
every shape, fail to augment that article, which is the prolific
parent of far the greatest part of the objects upon which they
are exerted? It is astonishing that so simple a truth should
ever have had an adversary; and it is one, among a multitude of
proofs, how apt a spirit of ill-informed jealousy, or of too
great abstraction and refinement, is to lead men astray from the
plainest truths of reason and conviction.
The ability of a country to pay taxes must always be
proportioned, in a great degree, to the quantity of money in
circulation, and to the celerity with which it circulates.
Commerce, contributing to both these objects, must of necessity
render the payment of taxes easier, and facilitate the requisite
supplies to the treasury. The hereditary dominions of the
Emperor of Germany contain a great extent of fertile,
cultivated, and populous territory, a large proportion of which
is situated in mild and luxuriant climates. In some parts of
this territory are to be found the best gold and silver mines in
Europe. And yet, from the want of the fostering influence of
commerce, that monarch can boast but slender revenues. He has
several times been compelled to owe obligations to the pecuniary
succors of other nations for the preservation of his essential
interests, and is unable, upon the strength of his own
resources, to sustain a long or continued war.
But it is not in this aspect of the subject alone that Union
will be seen to conduce to the purpose of revenue. There are
other points of view, in which its influence will appear more
immediate and decisive. It is evident from the state of the
country, from the habits of the people, from the experience we
have had on the point itself, that it is impracticable to raise
any very considerable sums by direct taxation. Tax laws have in
vain been multiplied; new methods to enforce the collection have
in vain been tried; the public expectation has been uniformly
disappointed, and the treasuries of the States have remained
empty. The popular system of administration inherent in the
nature of popular government, coinciding with the real scarcity
of money incident to a languid and mutilated state of trade, has
hitherto defeated every experiment for extensive collections,
and has at length taught the different legislatures the folly of
attempting them.
No person acquainted with what happens in other countries will
be surprised at this circumstance. In so opulent a nation as
that of Britain, where direct taxes from superior wealth must be
much more tolerable, and, from the vigor of the government, much
more practicable, than in America, far the greatest part of the
national revenue is derived from taxes of the indirect kind,
from imposts, and from excises. Duties on imported articles form
a large branch of this latter description.
In America, it is evident that we must a long time depend for
the means of revenue chiefly on such duties. In most parts of
it, excises must be confined within a narrow compass. The genius
of the people will ill brook the inquisitive and peremptory
spirit of excise laws. The pockets of the farmers, on the other
hand, will reluctantly yield but scanty supplies, in the
unwelcome shape of impositions on their houses and lands; and
personal property is too precarious and invisible a fund to be
laid hold of in any other way than by the inperceptible agency
of taxes on consumption.
If these remarks have any foundation, that state of things which
will best enable us to improve and extend so valuable a resource
must be best adapted to our political welfare. And it cannot
admit of a serious doubt, that this state of things must rest on
the basis of a general Union. As far as this would be conducive
to the interests of commerce, so far it must tend to the
extension of the revenue to be drawn from that source. As far as
it would contribute to rendering regulations for the collection
of the duties more simple and efficacious, so far it must serve
to answer the purposes of making the same rate of duties more
productive, and of putting it into the power of the government
to increase the rate without prejudice to trade.
The relative situation of these States; the number of rivers
with which they are intersected, and of bays that wash there
shores; the facility of communication in every direction; the
affinity of language and manners; the familiar habits of
intercourse; --all these are circumstances that would conspire
to render an illicit trade between them a matter of little
difficulty, and would insure frequent evasions of the commercial
regulations of each other. The separate States or confederacies
would be necessitated by mutual jealousy to avoid the
temptations to that kind of trade by the lowness of their
duties. The temper of our governments, for a long time to come,
would not permit those rigorous precautions by which the
European nations guard the avenues into their respective
countries, as well by land as by water; and which, even there,
are found insufficient obstacles to the adventurous stratagems
of avarice.
In France, there is an army of patrols (as they are called)
constantly employed to secure their fiscal regulations against
the inroads of the dealers in contraband trade. Mr. Neckar
computes the number of these patrols at upwards of twenty
thousand. This shows the immense difficulty in preventing that
species of traffic, where there is an inland communication, and
places in a strong light the disadvantages with which the
collection of duties in this country would be encumbered, if by
disunion the States should be placed in a situation, with
respect to each other, resembling that of France with respect to
her neighbors. The arbitrary and vexatious powers with which the
patrols are necessarily armed, would be intolerable in a free
country.
If, on the contrary, there be but one government pervading all
the States, there will be, as to the principal part of our
commerce, but ONE SIDE to guard--the ATLANTIC COAST. Vessels
arriving directly from foreign countries, laden with valuable
cargoes, would rarely choose to hazard themselves to the
complicated and critical perils which would attend attempts to
unlade prior to their coming into port. They would have to dread
both the dangers of the coast, and of detection, as well after
as before their arrival at the places of their final
destination. An ordinary degree of vigilance would be competent
to the prevention of any material infractions upon the rights of
the revenue. A few armed vessels, judiciously stationed at the
entrances of our ports, might at a small expense be made useful
sentinels of the laws. And the government having the same
interest to provide against violations everywhere, the
co-operation of its measures in each State would have a powerful
tendency to render them effectual. Here also we should preserve
by Union, an advantage which nature holds out to us, and which
would be relinquished by separation. The United States lie at a
great distance from Europe, and at a considerable distance from
all other places with which they would have extensive
connections of foreign trade. The passage from them to us, in a
few hours, or in a single night, as between the coasts of France
and Britain, and of other neighboring nations, would be
impracticable. This is a prodigious security against a direct
contraband with foreign countries; but a circuitous contraband
to one State, through the medium of another, would be both easy
and safe. The difference between a direct importation from
abroad, and an indirect importation through the channel of a
neighboring State, in small parcels, according to time and
opportunity, with the additional facilities of inland
communication, must be palpable to every man of discernment.
It is therefore evident, that one national government would be
able, at much less expense, to extend the duties on imports,
beyond comparison, further than would be practicable to the
States separately, or to any partial confederacies. Hitherto, I
believe, it may safely be asserted, that these duties have not
upon an average exceeded in any State three per cent. In France
they are estimated to be about fifteen per cent., and in Britain
they exceed this proportion. There seems to be nothing to hinder
their being increased in this country to at least treble their
present amount. The single article of ardent spirits, under
federal regulation, might be made to furnish a considerable
revenue. Upon a ratio to the importation into this State, the
whole quantity imported into the United States may be estimated
at four millions of gallons; which, at a shilling per gallon,
would produce two hundred thousand pounds. That article would
well bear this rate of duty; and if it should tend to diminish
the consumption of it, such an effect would be equally favorable
to the agriculture, to the economy, to the morals, and to the
health of the society. There is, perhaps, nothing so much a
subject of national extravagance as these spirits.
What will be the consequence, if we are not able to avail
ourselves of the resource in question in its full extent? A
nation cannot long exist without revenues. Destitute of this
essential support, it must resign its independence, and sink
into the degraded condition of a province. This is an extremity
to which no government will of choice accede. Revenue,
therefore, must be had at all events. In this country, if the
principal part be not drawn from commerce, it must fall with
oppressive weight upon land. It has been already intimated that
excises, in their true signification, are too little in unison
with the feelings of the people, to admit of great use being
made of that mode of taxation; nor, indeed, in the States where
almost the sole employment is agriculture, are the objects
proper for excise sufficiently numerous to permit very ample
collections in that way. Personal estate (as has been before
remarked), from the difficulty in tracing it, cannot be
subjected to large contributions, by any other means than by
taxes on consumption. In populous cities, it may be enough the
subject of conjecture, to occasion the oppression of
individuals, without much aggregate benefit to the State; but
beyond these circles, it must, in a great measure, escape the
eye and the hand of the tax-gatherer. As the necessities of the
State, nevertheless, must be satisfied in some mode or other,
the defect of other resources must throw the principal weight of
public burdens on the possessors of land. And as, on the other
hand, the wants of the government can never obtain an adequate
supply, unless all the sources of revenue are open to its
demands, the finances of the community, under such
embarrassments, cannot be put into a situation consistent with
its respectability or its security. Thus we shall not even have
the consolations of a full treasury, to atone for the oppression
of that valuable class of the citizens who are employed in the
cultivation of the soil. But public and private distress will
keep pace with each other in gloomy concert; and unite in
deploring the infatuation of those counsels which led to
disunion.
PUBLIUS. |
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