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Federalist
No. 25
The Same Subject Continued:
The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further
Considered
From the New York Packet. Friday, December 21, 1787. |
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Author: Alexander Hamilton
To the People of the State of New York:
IT MAY perhaps be urged that the objects enumerated in the
preceding number ought to be provided for by the State
governments, under the direction of the Union. But this would
be, in reality, an inversion of the primary principle of our
political association, as it would in practice transfer the care
of the common defense from the federal head to the individual
members: a project oppressive to some States, dangerous to all,
and baneful to the Confederacy.
The territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian nations in
our neighborhood do not border on particular States, but
encircle the Union from Maine to Georgia. The danger, though in
different degrees, is therefore common. And the means of
guarding against it ought, in like manner, to be the objects of
common councils and of a common treasury. It happens that some
States, from local situation, are more directly exposed. New
York is of this class. Upon the plan of separate provisions, New
York would have to sustain the whole weight of the
establishments requisite to her immediate safety, and to the
mediate or ultimate protection of her neighbors. This would
neither be equitable as it respected New York nor safe as it
respected the other States. Various inconveniences would attend
such a system. The States, to whose lot it might fall to support
the necessary establishments, would be as little able as
willing, for a considerable time to come, to bear the burden of
competent provisions. The security of all would thus be
subjected to the parsimony, improvidence, or inability of a
part. If the resources of such part becoming more abundant and
extensive, its provisions should be proportionally enlarged, the
other States would quickly take the alarm at seeing the whole
military force of the Union in the hands of two or three of its
members, and those probably amongst the most powerful. They
would each choose to have some counterpoise, and pretenses could
easily be contrived. In this situation, military establishments,
nourished by mutual jealousy, would be apt to swell beyond their
natural or proper size; and being at the separate disposal of
the members, they would be engines for the abridgment or
demolition of the national authcrity.
Reasons have been already given to induce a supposition that the
State governments will too naturally be prone to a rivalship
with that of the Union, the foundation of which will be the love
of power; and that in any contest between the federal head and
one of its members the people will be most apt to unite with
their local government. If, in addition to this immense
advantage, the ambition of the members should be stimulated by
the separate and independent possession of military forces, it
would afford too strong a temptation and too great a facility to
them to make enterprises upon, and finally to subvert, the
constitutional authority of the Union. On the other hand, the
liberty of the people would be less safe in this state of things
than in that which left the national forces in the hands of the
national government. As far as an army may be considered as a
dangerous weapon of power, it had better be in those hands of
which the people are most likely to be jealous than in those of
which they are least likely to be jealous. For it is a truth,
which the experience of ages has attested, that the people are
always most in danger when the means of injuring their rights
are in the possession of those of whom they entertain the least
suspicion.
The framers of the existing Confederation, fully aware of the
danger to the Union from the separate possession of military
forces by the States, have, in express terms, prohibited them
from having either ships or troops, unless with the consent of
Congress. The truth is, that the existence of a federal
government and military establishments under State authority are
not less at variance with each other than a due supply of the
federal treasury and the system of quotas and requisitions.
There are other lights besides those already taken notice of, in
which the impropriety of restraints on the discretion of the
national legislature will be equally manifest. The design of the
objection, which has been mentioned, is to preclude standing
armies in time of peace, though we have never been informed how
far it is designed the prohibition should extend; whether to
raising armies as well as to KEEPING THEM UP in a season of
tranquillity or not. If it be confined to the latter it will
have no precise signification, and it will be ineffectual for
the purpose intended. When armies are once raised what shall be
denominated ``keeping them up,'' contrary to the sense of the
Constitution? What time shall be requisite to ascertain the
violation? Shall it be a week, a month, a year? Or shall we say
they may be continued as long as the danger which occasioned
their being raised continues? This would be to admit that they
might be kept up IN TIME OF PEACE, against threatening or
impending danger, which would be at once to deviate from the
literal meaning of the prohibition, and to introduce an
extensive latitude of construction. Who shall judge of the
continuance of the danger? This must undoubtedly be submitted to
the national government, and the matter would then be brought to
this issue, that the national government, to provide against
apprehended danger, might in the first instance raise troops,
and might afterwards keep them on foot as long as they supposed
the peace or safety of the community was in any degree of
jeopardy. It is easy to perceive that a discretion so
latitudinary as this would afford ample room for eluding the
force of the provision.
The supposed utility of a provision of this kind can only be
founded on the supposed probability, or at least possibility, of
a combination between the executive and the legislative, in some
scheme of usurpation. Should this at any time happen, how easy
would it be to fabricate pretenses of approaching danger! Indian
hostilities, instigated by Spain or Britain, would always be at
hand. Provocations to produce the desired appearances might even
be given to some foreign power, and appeased again by timely
concessions. If we can reasonably presume such a combination to
have been formed, and that the enterprise is warranted by a
sufficient prospect of success, the army, when once raised, from
whatever cause, or on whatever pretext, may be applied to the
execution of the project.
If, to obviate this consequence, it should be resolved to extend
the prohibition to the RAISING of armies in time of peace, the
United States would then exhibit the most extraordinary
spectacle which the world has yet seen, that of a nation
incapacitated by its Constitution to prepare for defense, before
it was actually invaded. As the ceremony of a formal
denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse, the presence
of an enemy within our territories must be waited for, as the
legal warrant to the government to begin its levies of men for
the protection of the State. We must receive the blow, before we
could even prepare to return it. All that kind of policy by
which nations anticipate distant danger, and meet the gathering
storm, must be abstained from, as contrary to the genuine maxims
of a free government. We must expose our property and liberty to
the mercy of foreign invaders, and invite them by our weakness
to seize the naked and defenseless prey, because we are afraid
that rulers, created by our choice, dependent on our will, might
endanger that liberty, by an abuse of the means necessary to its
preservation.
Here I expect we shall be told that the militia of the country
is its natural bulwark, and would be at all times equal to the
national defense. This doctrine, in substance, had like to have
lost us our independence. It cost millions to the United States
that might have been saved. The facts which, from our own
experience, forbid a reliance of this kind, are too recent to
permit us to be the dupes of such a suggestion. The steady
operations of war against a regular and disciplined army can
only be successfully conducted by a force of the same kind.
Considerations of economy, not less than of stability and vigor,
confirm this position. The American militia, in the course of
the late war, have, by their valor on numerous occasions,
erected eternal monuments to their fame; but the bravest of them
feel and know that the liberty of their country could not have
been established by their efforts alone, however great and
valuable they were. War, like most other things, is a science to
be acquired and perfected by diligence, by perserverance, by
time, and by practice.
All violent policy, as it is contrary to the natural and
experienced course of human affairs, defeats itself.
Pennsylvania, at this instant, affords an example of the truth
of this remark. The Bill of Rights of that State declares that
standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be
kept up in time of peace. Pennsylvania, nevertheless, in a time
of profound peace, from the existence of partial disorders in
one or two of her counties, has resolved to raise a body of
troops; and in all probability will keep them up as long as
there is any appearance of danger to the public peace. The
conduct of Massachusetts affords a lesson on the same subject,
though on different ground. That State (without waiting for the
sanction of Congress, as the articles of the Confederation
require) was compelled to raise troops to quell a domestic
insurrection, and still keeps a corps in pay to prevent a
revival of the spirit of revolt. The particular constitution of
Massachusetts opposed no obstacle to the measure; but the
instance is still of use to instruct us that cases are likely to
occur under our government, as well as under those of other
nations, which will sometimes render a military force in time of
peace essential to the security of the society, and that it is
therefore improper in this respect to control the legislative
discretion. It also teaches us, in its application to the United
States, how little the rights of a feeble government are likely
to be respected, even by its own constituents. And it teaches
us, in addition to the rest, how unequal parchment provisions
are to a struggle with public necessity.
It was a fundamental maxim of the Lacedaemonian commonwealth,
that the post of admiral should not be conferred twice on the
same person. The Peloponnesian confederates, having suffered a
severe defeat at sea from the Athenians, demanded Lysander, who
had before served with success in that capacity, to command the
combined fleets. The Lacedaemonians, to gratify their allies,
and yet preserve the semblance of an adherence to their ancient
institutions, had recourse to the flimsy subterfuge of investing
Lysander with the real power of admiral, under the nominal title
of vice-admiral. This instance is selected from among a
multitude that might be cited to confirm the truth already
advanced and illustrated by domestic examples; which is, that
nations pay little regard to rules and maxims calculated in
their very nature to run counter to the necessities of society.
Wise politicians will be cautious about fettering the government
with restrictions that cannot be observed, because they know
that every breach of the fundamental laws, though dictated by
necessity, impairs that sacred reverence which ought to be
maintained in the breast of rulers towards the constitution of a
country, and forms a precedent for other breaches where the same
plea of necessity does not exist at all, or is less urgent and
palpable.
PUBLIUS. |
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