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Federalist
No. 50
Periodic Appeals to the
People Considered
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 5, 1788. |
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Author: Alexander Hamilton or James Madison
To the People of the State of New York:
IT MAY be contended, perhaps, that instead of OCCASIONAL appeals
to the people, which are liable to the objections urged against
them, PERIODICAL appeals are the proper and adequate means of
PREVENTING AND CORRECTING INFRACTIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. It
will be attended to, that in the examination of these
expedients, I confine myself to their aptitude for ENFORCING the
Constitution, by keeping the several departments of power within
their due bounds, without particularly considering them as
provisions for ALTERING the Constitution itself. In the first
view, appeals to the people at fixed periods appear to be nearly
as ineligible as appeals on particular occasions as they emerge.
If the periods be separated by short intervals, the measures to
be reviewed and rectified will have been of recent date, and
will be connected with all the circumstances which tend to
vitiate and pervert the result of occasional revisions. If the
periods be distant from each other, the same remark will be
applicable to all recent measures; and in proportion as the
remoteness of the others may favor a dispassionate review of
them, this advantage is inseparable from inconveniences which
seem to counterbalance it. In the first place, a distant
prospect of public censure would be a very feeble restraint on
power from those excesses to which it might be urged by the
force of present motives. Is it to be imagined that a
legislative assembly, consisting of a hundred or two hundred
members, eagerly bent on some favorite object, and breaking
through the restraints of the Constitution in pursuit of it,
would be arrested in their career, by considerations drawn from
a censorial revision of their conduct at the future distance of
ten, fifteen, or twenty years? In the next place, the abuses
would often have completed their mischievous effects before the
remedial provision would be applied. And in the last place,
where this might not be the case, they would be of long
standing, would have taken deep root, and would not easily be
extirpated. The scheme of revising the constitution, in order to
correct recent breaches of it, as well as for other purposes,
has been actually tried in one of the States. One of the objects
of the Council of Censors which met in Pennsylvania in 1783 and
1784, was, as we have seen, to inquire, ``whether the
constitution had been violated, and whether the legislative and
executive departments had encroached upon each other. '' This
important and novel experiment in politics merits, in several
points of view, very particular attention. In some of them it
may, perhaps, as a single experiment, made under circumstances
somewhat peculiar, be thought to be not absolutely conclusive.
But as applied to the case under consideration, it involves some
facts, which I venture to remark, as a complete and satisfactory
illustration of the reasoning which I have employed. First. It
appears, from the names of the gentlemen who composed the
council, that some, at least, of its most active members had
also been active and leading characters in the parties which
pre-existed in the State.
Secondly. It appears that the same active and leading members of
the council had been active and influential members of the
legislative and executive branches, within the period to be
reviewed; and even patrons or opponents of the very measures to
be thus brought to the test of the constitution. Two of the
members had been vice-presidents of the State, and several other
members of the executive council, within the seven preceding
years. One of them had been speaker, and a number of others
distinguished members, of the legislative assembly within the
same period.
Thirdly. Every page of their proceedings witnesses the effect of
all these circumstances on the temper of their deliberations.
Throughout the continuance of the council, it was split into two
fixed and violent parties. The fact is acknowledged and lamented
by themselves. Had this not been the case, the face of their
proceedings exhibits a proof equally satisfactory. In all
questions, however unimportant in themselves, or unconnected
with each other, the same names stand invariably contrasted on
the opposite columns. Every unbiased observer may infer, without
danger of mistake, and at the same time without meaning to
reflect on either party, or any individuals of either party,
that, unfortunately, PASSION, not REASON, must have presided
over their decisions. When men exercise their reason coolly and
freely on a variety of distinct questions, they inevitably fall
into different opinions on some of them. When they are governed
by a common passion, their opinions, if they are so to be
called, will be the same.
Fourthly. It is at least problematical, whether the decisions of
this body do not, in several instances, misconstrue the limits
prescribed for the legislative and executive departments,
instead of reducing and limiting them within their
constitutional places.
Fifthly. I have never understood that the decisions of the
council on constitutional questions, whether rightly or
erroneously formed, have had any effect in varying the practice
founded on legislative constructions. It even appears, if I
mistake not, that in one instance the contemporary legislature
denied the constructions of the council, and actually prevailed
in the contest. This censorial body, therefore, proves at the
same time, by its researches, the existence of the disease, and
by its example, the inefficacy of the remedy. This conclusion
cannot be invalidated by alleging that the State in which the
experiment was made was at that crisis, and had been for a long
time before, violently heated and distracted by the rage of
party. Is it to be presumed, that at any future septennial epoch
the same State will be free from parties? Is it to be presumed
that any other State, at the same or any other given period,
will be exempt from them? Such an event ought to be neither
presumed nor desired; because an extinction of parties
necessarily implies either a universal alarm for the public
safety, or an absolute extinction of liberty. Were the
precaution taken of excluding from the assemblies elected by the
people, to revise the preceding administration of the
government, all persons who should have been concerned with the
government within the given period, the difficulties would not
be obviated. The important task would probably devolve on men,
who, with inferior capacities, would in other respects be little
better qualified. Although they might not have been personally
concerned in the administration, and therefore not immediately
agents in the measures to be examined, they would probably have
been involved in the parties connected with these measures, and
have been elected under their auspices.
PUBLIUS. |
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