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Federalist
No. 53
The Same Subject Continued:
The House of Representatives
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 12, 1788.
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Author: Alexander Hamilton or James Madison
To the People of the State of New York:
I SHALL here, perhaps, be reminded of a current observation,
``that where annual elections end, tyranny begins. '' If it be
true, as has often been remarked, that sayings which become
proverbial are generally founded in reason, it is not less true,
that when once established, they are often applied to cases to
which the reason of them does not extend. I need not look for a
proof beyond the case before us. What is the reason on which
this proverbial observation is founded? No man will subject
himself to the ridicule of pretending that any natural
connection subsists between the sun or the seasons, and the
period within which human virtue can bear the temptations of
power. Happily for mankind, liberty is not, in this respect,
confined to any single point of time; but lies within extremes,
which afford sufficient latitude for all the variations which
may be required by the various situations and circumstances of
civil society. The election of magistrates might be, if it were
found expedient, as in some instances it actually has been,
daily, weekly, or monthly, as well as annual; and if
circumstances may require a deviation from the rule on one side,
why not also on the other side? Turning our attention to the
periods established among ourselves, for the election of the
most numerous branches of the State legislatures, we find them
by no means coinciding any more in this instance, than in the
elections of other civil magistrates. In Connecticut and Rhode
Island, the periods are half-yearly. In the other States, South
Carolina excepted, they are annual. In South Carolina they are
biennial as is proposed in the federal government. Here is a
difference, as four to one, between the longest and shortest
periods; and yet it would be not easy to show, that Connecticut
or Rhode Island is better governed, or enjoys a greater share of
rational liberty, than South Carolina; or that either the one or
the other of these States is distinguished in these respects,
and by these causes, from the States whose elections are
different from both. In searching for the grounds of this
doctrine, I can discover but one, and that is wholly
inapplicable to our case. The important distinction so well
understood in America, between a Constitution established by the
people and unalterable by the government, and a law established
by the government and alterable by the government, seems to have
been little understood and less observed in any other country.
Wherever the supreme power of legislation has resided, has been
supposed to reside also a full power to change the form of the
government. Even in Great Britain, where the principles of
political and civil liberty have been most discussed, and where
we hear most of the rights of the Constitution, it is maintained
that the authority of the Parliament is transcendent and
uncontrollable, as well with regard to the Constitution, as the
ordinary objects of legislative provision. They have
accordingly, in several instances, actually changed, by
legislative acts, some of the most fundamental articles of the
government. They have in particular, on several occasions,
changed the period of election; and, on the last occasion, not
only introduced septennial in place of triennial elections, but
by the same act, continued themselves in place four years beyond
the term for which they were elected by the people. An attention
to these dangerous practices has produced a very natural alarm
in the votaries of free government, of which frequency of
elections is the corner-stone; and has led them to seek for some
security to liberty, against the danger to which it is exposed.
Where no Constitution, paramount to the government, either
existed or could be obtained, no constitutional security,
similar to that established in the United States, was to be
attempted. Some other security, therefore, was to be sought for;
and what better security would the case admit, than that of
selecting and appealing to some simple and familiar portion of
time, as a standard for measuring the danger of innovations, for
fixing the national sentiment, and for uniting the patriotic
exertions? The most simple and familiar portion of time,
applicable to the subject was that of a year; and hence the
doctrine has been inculcated by a laudable zeal, to erect some
barrier against the gradual innovations of an unlimited
government, that the advance towards tyranny was to be
calculated by the distance of departure from the fixed point of
annual elections. But what necessity can there be of applying
this expedient to a government limited, as the federal
government will be, by the authority of a paramount
Constitution? Or who will pretend that the liberties of the
people of America will not be more secure under biennial
elections, unalterably fixed by such a Constitution, than those
of any other nation would be, where elections were annual, or
even more frequent, but subject to alterations by the ordinary
power of the government? The second question stated is, whether
biennial elections be necessary or useful. The propriety of
answering this question in the affirmative will appear from
several very obvious considerations. No man can be a competent
legislator who does not add to an upright intention and a sound
judgment a certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which
he is to legislate. A part of this knowledge may be acquired by
means of information which lie within the compass of men in
private as well as public stations. Another part can only be
attained, or at least thoroughly attained, by actual experience
in the station which requires the use of it. The period of
service, ought, therefore, in all such cases, to bear some
proportion to the extent of practical knowledge requisite to the
due performance of the service. The period of legislative
service established in most of the States for the more numerous
branch is, as we have seen, one year. The question then may be
put into this simple form: does the period of two years bear no
greater proportion to the knowledge requisite for federal
legislation than one year does to the knowledge requisite for
State legislation? The very statement of the question, in this
form, suggests the answer that ought to be given to it. In a
single State, the requisite knowledge relates to the existing
laws which are uniform throughout the State, and with which all
the citizens are more or less conversant; and to the general
affairs of the State, which lie within a small compass, are not
very diversified, and occupy much of the attention and
conversation of every class of people. The great theatre of the
United States presents a very different scene. The laws are so
far from being uniform, that they vary in every State; whilst
the public affairs of the Union are spread throughout a very
extensive region, and are extremely diversified by t e local
affairs connected with them, and can with difficulty be
correctly learnt in any other place than in the central councils
to which a knowledge of them will be brought by the
representatives of every part of the empire. Yet some knowledge
of the affairs, and even of the laws, of all the States, ought
to be possessed by the members from each of the States. How can
foreign trade be properly regulated by uniform laws, without
some acquaintance with the commerce, the ports, the usages, and
the regulatious of the different States? How can the trade
between the different States be duly regulated, without some
knowledge of their relative situations in these and other
respects? How can taxes be judiciously imposed and effectually
collected, if they be not accommodated to the different laws and
local circumstances relating to these objects in the different
States? How can uniform regulations for the militia be duly
provided, without a similar knowledge of many internal
circumstances by which the States are distinguished from each
other? These are the principal objects of federal legislation,
and suggest most forcibly the extensive information which the
representatives ought to acquire. The other interior objects
will require a proportional degree of information with regard to
them. It is true that all these difficulties will, by degrees,
be very much diminished. The most laborious task will be the
proper inauguration of the government and the primeval formation
of a federal code. Improvements on the first draughts will every
year become both easier and fewer. Past transactions of the
government will be a ready and accurate source of information to
new members. The affairs of the Union will become more and more
objects of curiosity and conversation among the citizens at
large. And the increased intercourse among those of different
States will contribute not a little to diffuse a mutual
knowledge of their affairs, as this again will contribute to a
general assimilation of their manners and laws. But with all
these abatements, the business of federal legislation must
continue so far to exceed, both in novelty and difficulty, the
legislative business of a single State, as to justify the longer
period of service assigned to those who are to transact it. A
branch of knowledge which belongs to the acquirements of a
federal representative, and which has not been mentioned is that
of foreign affairs. In regulating our own commerce he ought to
be not only acquainted with the treaties between the United
States and other nations, but also with the commercial policy
and laws of other nations. He ought not to be altogether
ignorant of the law of nations; for that, as far as it is a
proper object of municipal legislation, is submitted to the
federal government.
And although the House of Representatives is not immediately to
participate in foreign negotiations and arrangements, yet from
the necessary connection between the several branches of public
affairs, those particular branches will frequently deserve
attention in the ordinary course of legislation, and will
sometimes demand particular legislative sanction and
co-operation. Some portion of this knowledge may, no doubt, be
acquired in a man's closet; but some of it also can only be
derived from the public sources of information; and all of it
will be acquired to best effect by a practical attention to the
subject during the period of actual service in the legislature.
There are other considerations, of less importance, perhaps, but
which are not unworthy of notice. The distance which many of the
representatives will be obliged to travel, and the arrangements
rendered necessary by that circumstance, might be much more
serious objections with fit men to this service, if limited to a
single year, than if extended to two years. No argument can be
drawn on this subject, from the case of the delegates to the
existing Congress. They are elected annually, it is true; but
their re-election is considered by the legislative assemblies
almost as a matter of course. The election of the
representatives by the people would not be governed by the same
principle. A few of the members, as happens in all such
assemblies, will possess superior talents; will, by frequent
reelections, become members of long standing; will be thoroughly
masters of the public business, and perhaps not unwilling to
avail themselves of those advantages. The greater the proportion
of new members, and the less the information of the bulk of the
members the more apt will they be to fall into the snares that
may be laid for them. This remark is no less applicable to the
relation which will subsist between the House of Representatives
and the Senate. It is an inconvenience mingled with the
advantages of our frequent elections even in single States,
where they are large, and hold but one legislative session in a
year, that spurious elections cannot be investigated and
annulled in time for the decision to have its due effect. If a
return can be obtained, no matter by what unlawful means, the
irregular member, who takes his seat of course, is sure of
holding it a sufficient time to answer his purposes. Hence, a
very pernicious encouragement is given to the use of unlawful
means, for obtaining irregular returns. Were elections for the
federal legislature to be annual, this practice might become a
very serious abuse, particularly in the more distant States.
Each house is, as it necessarily must be, the judge of the
elections, qualifications, and returns of its members; and
whatever improvements may be suggested by experience, for
simplifying and accelerating the process in disputed cases, so
great a portion of a year would unavoidably elapse, before an
illegitimate member could be dispossessed of his seat, that the
prospect of such an event would be little check to unfair and
illicit means of obtaining a seat. All these considerations
taken together warrant us in affirming, that biennial elections
will be as useful to the affairs of the public as we have seen
that they will be safe to the liberty of the people.
PUBLIUS. |
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