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Federalist
No. 66
Objections to the Power of
the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further
Considered
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, March 11, 1788. |
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Author: Alexander Hamilton
To the People of the State of New York:
A REVIEW of the principal objections that have appeared against
the proposed court for the trial of impeachments, will not
improbably eradicate the remains of any unfavorable impressions
which may still exist in regard to this matter.
The FIRST of these objections is, that the provision in question
confounds legislative and judiciary authorities in the same
body, in violation of that important and well established maxim
which requires a separation between the different departments of
power. The true meaning of this maxim has been discussed and
ascertained in another place, and has been shown to be entirely
compatible with a partial intermixture of those departments for
special purposes, preserving them, in the main, distinct and
unconnected. This partial intermixture is even, in some cases,
not only proper but necessary to the mutual defense of the
several members of the government against each other. An
absolute or qualified negative in the executive upon the acts of
the legislative body, is admitted, by the ablest adepts in
political science, to be an indispensable barrier against the
encroachments of the latter upon the former. And it may,
perhaps, with no less reason be contended, that the powers
relating to impeachments are, as before intimated, an essential
check in the hands of that body upon the encroachments of the
executive. The division of them between the two branches of the
legislature, assigning to one the right of accusing, to the
other the right of judging, avoids the inconvenience of making
the same persons both accusers and judges; and guards against
the danger of persecution, from the prevalency of a factious
spirit in either of those branches. As the concurrence of two
thirds of the Senate will be requisite to a condemnation, the
security to innocence, from this additional circumstance, will
be as complete as itself can desire.
It is curious to observe, with what vehemence this part of the
plan is assailed, on the principle here taken notice of, by men
who profess to admire, without exception, the constitution of
this State; while that constitution makes the Senate, together
with the chancellor and judges of the Supreme Court, not only a
court of impeachments, but the highest judicatory in the State,
in all causes, civil and criminal. The proportion, in point of
numbers, of the chancellor and judges to the senators, is so
inconsiderable, that the judiciary authority of New York, in the
last resort, may, with truth, be said to reside in its Senate.
If the plan of the convention be, in this respect, chargeable
with a departure from the celebrated maxim which has been so
often mentioned, and seems to be so little understood, how much
more culpable must be the constitution of New York?
A SECOND objection to the Senate, as a court of impeachments,
is, that it contributes to an undue accumulation of power in
that body, tending to give to the government a countenance too
aristocratic. The Senate, it is observed, is to have concurrent
authority with the Executive in the formation of treaties and in
the appointment to offices: if, say the objectors, to these
prerogatives is added that of deciding in all cases of
impeachment, it will give a decided predominancy to senatorial
influence. To an objection so little precise in itself, it is
not easy to find a very precise answer. Where is the measure or
criterion to which we can appeal, for determining what will give
the Senate too much, too little, or barely the proper degree of
influence? Will it not be more safe, as well as more simple, to
dismiss such vague and uncertain calculations, to examine each
power by itself, and to decide, on general principles, where it
may be deposited with most advantage and least inconvenience?
If we take this course, it will lead to a more intelligible, if
not to a more certain result. The disposition of the power of
making treaties, which has obtained in the plan of the
convention, will, then, if I mistake not, appear to be fully
justified by the considerations stated in a former number, and
by others which will occur under the next head of our inquiries.
The expediency of the junction of the Senate with the Executive,
in the power of appointing to offices, will, I trust, be placed
in a light not less satisfactory, in the disquisitions under the
same head. And I flatter myself the observations in my last
paper must have gone no inconsiderable way towards proving that
it was not easy, if practicable, to find a more fit receptacle
for the power of determining impeachments, than that which has
been chosen. If this be truly the case, the hypothetical dread
of the too great weight of the Senate ought to be discarded from
our reasonings.
But this hypothesis, such as it is, has already been refuted in
the remarks applied to the duration in office prescribed for the
senators. It was by them shown, as well on the credit of
historical examples, as from the reason of the thing, that the
most POPULAR branch of every government, partaking of the
republican genius, by being generally the favorite of the
people, will be as generally a full match, if not an overmatch,
for every other member of the Government.
But independent of this most active and operative principle, to
secure the equilibrium of the national House of Representatives,
the plan of the convention has provided in its favor several
important counterpoises to the additional authorities to be
conferred upon the Senate. The exclusive privilege of
originating money bills will belong to the House of
Representatives. The same house will possess the sole right of
instituting impeachments: is not this a complete counterbalance
to that of determining them? The same house will be the umpire
in all elections of the President, which do not unite the
suffrages of a majority of the whole number of electors; a case
which it cannot be doubted will sometimes, if not frequently,
happen. The constant possibility of the thing must be a fruitful
source of influence to that body. The more it is contemplated,
the more important will appear this ultimate though contingent
power, of deciding the competitions of the most illustrious
citizens of the Union, for the first office in it. It would not
perhaps be rash to predict, that as a mean of influence it will
be found to outweigh all the peculiar attributes of the Senate.
A THIRD objection to the Senate as a court of impeachments, is
drawn from the agency they are to have in the appointments to
office. It is imagined that they would be too indulgent judges
of the conduct of men, in whose official creation they had
participated. The principle of this objection would condemn a
practice, which is to be seen in all the State governments, if
not in all the governments with which we are acquainted: I mean
that of rendering those who hold offices during pleasure,
dependent on the pleasure of those who appoint them. With equal
plausibility might it be alleged in this case, that the
favoritism of the latter would always be an asylum for the
misbehavior of the former. But that practice, in contradiction
to this principle, proceeds upon the presumption, that the
responsibility of those who appoint, for the fitness and
competency of the persons on whom they bestow their choice, and
the interest they will have in the respectable and prosperous
administration of affairs, will inspire a sufficient disposition
to dismiss from a share in it all such who, by their conduct,
shall have proved themselves unworthy of the confidence reposed
in them. Though facts may not always correspond with this
presumption, yet if it be, in the main, just, it must destroy
the supposition that the Senate, who will merely sanction the
choice of the Executive, should feel a bias, towards the objects
of that choice, strong enough to blind them to the evidences of
guilt so extraordinary, as to have induced the representatives
of the nation to become its accusers.
If any further arguments were necessary to evince the
improbability of such a bias, it might be found in the nature of
the agency of the Senate in the business of appointments.
It will be the office of the President to NOMINATE, and, with
the advice and consent of the Senate, to APPOINT. There will, of
course, be no exertion of CHOICE on the part of the Senate. They
may defeat one choice of the Executive, and oblige him to make
another; but they cannot themselves CHOOSE, they can only ratify
or reject the choice of the President. They might even entertain
a preference to some other person, at the very moment they were
assenting to the one proposed, because there might be no
positive ground of opposition to him; and they could not be
sure, if they withheld their assent, that the subsequent
nomination would fall upon their own favorite, or upon any other
person in their estimation more meritorious than the one
rejected. Thus it could hardly happen, that the majority of the
Senate would feel any other complacency towards the object of an
appointment than such as the appearances of merit might inspire,
and the proofs of the want of it destroy.
A FOURTH objection to the Senate in the capacity of a court of
impeachments, is derived from its union with the Executive in
the power of making treaties. This, it has been said, would
constitute the senators their own judges, in every case of a
corrupt or perfidious execution of that trust. After having
combined with the Executive in betraying the interests of the
nation in a ruinous treaty, what prospect, it is asked, would
there be of their being made to suffer the punishment they would
deserve, when they were themselves to decide upon the accusation
brought against them for the treachery of which they have been
guilty?
This objection has been circulated with more earnestness and
with greater show of reason than any other which has appeared
against this part of the plan; and yet I am deceived if it does
not rest upon an erroneous foundation.
The security essentially intended by the Constitution against
corruption and treachery in the formation of treaties, is to be
sought for in the numbers and characters of those who are to
make them. The JOINT AGENCY of the Chief Magistrate of the
Union, and of two thirds of the members of a body selected by
the collective wisdom of the legislatures of the several States,
is designed to be the pledge for the fidelity of the national
councils in this particular. The convention might with propriety
have meditated the punishment of the Executive, for a deviation
from the instructions of the Senate, or a want of integrity in
the conduct of the negotiations committed to him; they might
also have had in view the punishment of a few leading
individuals in the Senate, who should have prostituted their
influence in that body as the mercenary instruments of foreign
corruption: but they could not, with more or with equal
propriety, have contemplated the impeachment and punishment of
two thirds of the Senate, consenting to an improper treaty, than
of a majority of that or of the other branch of the national
legislature, consenting to a pernicious or unconstitutional law,
a principle which, I believe, has never been admitted into any
government. How, in fact, could a majority in the House of
Representatives impeach themselves? Not better, it is evident,
than two thirds of the Senate might try themselves. And yet what
reason is there, that a majority of the House of
Representatives, sacrificing the interests of the society by an
unjust and tyrannical act of legislation, should escape with
impunity, more than two thirds of the Senate, sacrificing the
same interests in an injurious treaty with a foreign power? The
truth is, that in all such cases it is essential to the freedom
and to the necessary independence of the deliberations of the
body, that the members of it should be exempt from punishment
for acts done in a collective capacity; and the security to the
society must depend on the care which is taken to confide the
trust to proper hands, to make it their interest to execute it
with fidelity, and to make it as difficult as possible for them
to combine in any interest opposite to that of the public good.
So far as might concern the misbehavior of the Executive in
perverting the instructions or contravening the views of the
Senate, we need not be apprehensive of the want of a disposition
in that body to punish the abuse of their confidence or to
vindicate their own authority. We may thus far count upon their
pride, if not upon their virtue. And so far even as might
concern the corruption of leading members, by whose arts and
influence the majority may have been inveigled into measures
odious to the community, if the proofs of that corruption should
be satisfactory, the usual propensity of human nature will
warrant us in concluding that there would be commonly no defect
of inclination in the body to divert the public resentment from
themselves by a ready sacrifice of the authors of their
mismanagement and disgrace.
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