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Federalist
No. 69
The Real Character of the
Executive
From the New York Packet Friday, March 14, 1788. |
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Author: Alexander Hamilton
To the People of the State of New York:
I PROCEED now to trace the real characters of the proposed Executive, as they
are marked out in the plan of the convention. This will serve to place in a
strong light the unfairness of the representations which have been made in
regard to it.
The first thing which strikes our attention is, that the executive authority,
with few exceptions, is to be vested in a single magistrate. This will scarcely,
however, be considered as a point upon which any comparison can be grounded; for
if, in this particular, there be a resemblance to the king of Great Britain,
there is not less a resemblance to the Grand Seignior, to the khan of Tartary,
to the Man of the Seven Mountains, or to the governor of New York.
That magistrate is to be elected for FOUR years; and is to be re-eligible as
often as the people of the United States shall think him worthy of their
confidence. In these circumstances there is a total dissimilitude between HIM
and a king of Great Britain, who is an HEREDITARY monarch, possessing the crown
as a patrimony descendible to his heirs forever; but there is a close analogy
between HIM and a governor of New York, who is elected for THREE years, and is
re-eligible without limitation or intermission. If we consider how much less
time would be requisite for establishing a dangerous influence in a single
State, than for establishing a like influence throughout the United States, we
must conclude that a duration of FOUR years for the Chief Magistrate of the
Union is a degree of permanency far less to be dreaded in that office, than a
duration of THREE years for a corresponding office in a single State.
The President of the United States would be liable to be impeached, tried, and,
upon conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors,
removed from office; and would afterwards be liable to prosecution and
punishment in the ordinary course of law. The person of the king of Great
Britain is sacred and inviolable; there is no constitutional tribunal to which
he is amenable; no punishment to which he can be subjected without involving the
crisis of a national revolution. In this delicate and important circumstance of
personal responsibility, the President of Confederated America would stand upon
no better ground than a governor of New York, and upon worse ground than the
governors of Maryland and Delaware.
The President of the United States is to have power to return a bill, which
shall have passed the two branches of the legislature, for reconsideration; and
the bill so returned is to become a law, if, upon that reconsideration, it be
approved by two thirds of both houses. The king of Great Britain, on his part,
has an absolute negative upon the acts of the two houses of Parliament. The
disuse of that power for a considerable time past does not affect the reality of
its existence; and is to be ascribed wholly to the crown's having found the
means of substituting influence to authority, or the art of gaining a majority
in one or the other of the two houses, to the necessity of exerting a
prerogative which could seldom be exerted without hazarding some degree of
national agitation. The qualified negative of the President differs widely from
this absolute negative of the British sovereign; and tallies exactly with the
revisionary authority of the council of revision of this State, of which the
governor is a constituent part. In this respect the power of the President would
exceed that of the governor of New York, because the former would possess,
singly, what the latter shares with the chancellor and judges; but it would be
precisely the same with that of the governor of Massachusetts, whose
constitution, as to this article, seems to have been the original from which the
convention have copied.
The President is to be the ``commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the
United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the
actual service of the United States. He is to have power to grant reprieves and
pardons for offenses against the United States, EXCEPT IN CASES OF IMPEACHMENT;
to recommend to the consideration of Congress such measures as he shall judge
necessary and expedient; to convene, on extraordinary occasions, both houses of
the legislature, or either of them, and, in case of disagreement between them
WITH RESPECT TO THE TIME OF ADJOURNMENT, to adjourn them to such time as he
shall think proper; to take care that the laws be faithfully executed; and to
commission all officers of the United States.'' In most of these particulars,
the power of the President will resemble equally that of the king of Great
Britain and of the governor of New York. The most material points of difference
are these: First. The President will have only the occasional command of such
part of the militia of the nation as by legislative provision may be called into
the actual service of the Union. The king of Great Britain and the governor of
New York have at all times the entire command of all the militia within their
several jurisdictions. In this article, therefore, the power of the President
would be inferior to that of either the monarch or the governor. Secondly. The
President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States.
In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the king
of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to
nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval
forces, as first General and admiral of the Confederacy; while that of the
British king extends to the DECLARING of war and to the RAISING and REGULATING
of fleets and armies, all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would
appertain to the legislature. The governor of New York, on the other hand, is by
the constitution of the State vested only with the command of its militia and
navy. But the constitutions of several of the States expressly declare their
governors to be commanders-in-chief, as well of the army as navy; and it may
well be a question, whether those of New Hampshire and Massachusetts, in
particular, do not, in this instance, confer larger powers upon their respective
governors, than could be claimed by a President of the United States. Thirdly.
The power of the President, in respect to pardons, would extend to all cases,
EXCEPT THOSE OF IMPEACHMENT. The governor of New York may pardon in all cases,
even in those of impeachment, except for treason and murder. Is not the power of
the governor, in this article, on a calculation of political consequences,
greater than that of the President? All conspiracies and plots against the
government, which have not been matured into actual treason, may be screened
from punishment of every kind, by the interposition of the prerogative of
pardoning. If a governor of New York, therefore, should be at the head of any
such conspiracy, until the design had been ripened into actual hostility he
could insure his accomplices and adherents an entire impunity. A President of
the Union, on the other hand, though he may even pardon treason, when prosecuted
in the ordinary course of law, could shelter no offender, in any degree, from
the effects of impeachment and conviction. Would not the prospect of a total
indemnity for all the preliminary steps be a greater temptation to undertake and
persevere in an enterprise against the public liberty, than the mere prospect of
an exemption from death and confiscation, if the final execution of the design,
upon an actual appeal to arms, should miscarry? Would this last expectation have
any influence at all, when the probability was computed, that the person who was
to afford that exemption might himself be involved in the consequences of the
measure, and might be incapacitated by his agency in it from affording the
desired impunity? The better to judge of this matter, it will be necessary to
recollect, that, by the proposed Constitution, the offense of treason is limited
``to levying war upon the United States, and adhering to their enemies, giving
them aid and comfort''; and that by the laws of New York it is confined within
similar bounds. Fourthly. The President can only adjourn the national
legislature in the single case of disagreement about the time of adjournment.
The British monarch may prorogue or even dissolve the Parliament. The governor
of New York may also prorogue the legislature of this State for a limited time;
a power which, in certain situations, may be employed to very important
purposes.
The President is to have power, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to
make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators present concur. The king of
Great Britain is the sole and absolute representative of the nation in all
foreign transactions. He can of his own accord make treaties of peace, commerce,
alliance, and of every other description. It has been insinuated, that his
authority in this respect is not conclusive, and that his conventions with
foreign powers are subject to the revision, and stand in need of the
ratification, of Parliament. But I believe this doctrine was never heard of,
until it was broached upon the present occasion. Every jurist of that kingdom,
and every other man acquainted with its Constitution, knows, as an established
fact, that the prerogative of making treaties exists in the crown in its utmost
plentitude; and that the compacts entered into by the royal authority have the
most complete legal validity and perfection, independent of any other sanction.
The Parliament, it is true, is sometimes seen employing itself in altering the
existing laws to conform them to the stipulations in a new treaty; and this may
have possibly given birth to the imagination, that its co-operation was
necessary to the obligatory efficacy of the treaty. But this parliamentary
interposition proceeds from a different cause: from the necessity of adjusting a
most artificial and intricate system of revenue and commercial laws, to the
changes made in them by the operation of the treaty; and of adapting new
provisions and precautions to the new state of things, to keep the machine from
running into disorder. In this respect, therefore, there is no comparison
between the intended power of the President and the actual power of the British
sovereign. The one can perform alone what the other can do only with the
concurrence of a branch of the legislature. It must be admitted, that, in this
instance, the power of the federal Executive would exceed that of any State
Executive. But this arises naturally from the sovereign power which relates to
treaties. If the Confederacy were to be dissolved, it would become a question,
whether the Executives of the several States were not solely invested with that
delicate and important prerogative.
The President is also to be authorized to receive ambassadors and other public
ministers. This, though it has been a rich theme of declamation, is more a
matter of dignity than of authority. It is a circumstance which will be without
consequence in the administration of the government; and it was far more
convenient that it should be arranged in this manner, than that there should be
a necessity of convening the legislature, or one of its branches, upon every
arrival of a foreign minister, though it were merely to take the place of a
departed predecessor.
The President is to nominate, and, WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE, to
appoint ambassadors and other public ministers, judges of the Supreme Court, and
in general all officers of the United States established by law, and whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by the Constitution. The king of
Great Britain is emphatically and truly styled the fountain of honor. He not
only appoints to all offices, but can create offices. He can confer titles of
nobility at pleasure; and has the disposal of an immense number of church
preferments. There is evidently a great inferiority in the power of the
President, in this particular, to that of the British king; nor is it equal to
that of the governor of New York, if we are to interpret the meaning of the
constitution of the State by the practice which has obtained under it. The power
of appointment is with us lodged in a council, composed of the governor and four
members of the Senate, chosen by the Assembly. The governor CLAIMS, and has
frequently EXERCISED, the right of nomination, and is ENTITLED to a casting vote
in the appointment. If he really has the right of nominating, his authority is
in this respect equal to that of the President, and exceeds it in the article of
the casting vote. In the national government, if the Senate should be divided,
no appointment could be made; in the government of New York, if the council
should be divided, the governor can turn the scale, and confirm his own
nomination. If we compare the publicity which must necessarily attend the
mode of appointment by the President and an entire branch of the national
legislature, with the privacy in the mode of appointment by the governor of New
York, closeted in a secret apartment with at most four, and frequently with only
two persons; and if we at the same time consider how much more easy it must be
to influence the small number of which a council of appointment consists, than
the considerable number of which the national Senate would consist, we cannot
hesitate to pronounce that the power of the chief magistrate of this State, in
the disposition of offices, must, in practice, be greatly superior to that of
the Chief Magistrate of the Union.
Hence it appears that, except as to the concurrent authority of the President in
the article of treaties, it would be difficult to determine whether that
magistrate would, in the aggregate, possess more or less power than the Governor
of New York. And it appears yet more unequivocally, that there is no pretense
for the parallel which has been attempted between him and the king of Great
Britain. But to render the contrast in this respect still more striking, it may
be of use to throw the principal circumstances of dissimilitude into a closer
group.
The President of the United States would be an officer elected by the people for
FOUR years; the king of Great Britain is a perpetual and HEREDITARY prince. The
one would be amenable to personal punishment and disgrace; the person of the
other is sacred and inviolable. The one would have a QUALIFIED negative upon the
acts of the legislative body; the other has an ABSOLUTE negative. The one would
have a right to command the military and naval forces of the nation; the other,
in addition to this right, possesses that of DECLARING war, and of RAISING and
REGULATING fleets and armies by his own authority. The one would have a
concurrent power with a branch of the legislature in the formation of treaties;
the other is the SOLE POSSESSOR of the power of making treaties. The one would
have a like concurrent authority in appointing to offices; the other is the sole
author of all appointments. The one can confer no privileges whatever; the other
can make denizens of aliens, noblemen of commoners; can erect corporations with
all the rights incident to corporate bodies. The one can prescribe no rules
concerning the commerce or currency of the nation; the other is in several
respects the arbiter of commerce, and in this capacity can establish markets and
fairs, can regulate weights and measures, can lay embargoes for a limited time,
can coin money, can authorize or prohibit the circulation of foreign coin. The
one has no particle of spiritual jurisdiction; the other is the supreme head and
governor of the national church! What answer shall we give to those who would
persuade us that things so unlike resemble each other? The same that ought to be
given to those who tell us that a government, the whole power of which would be
in the hands of the elective and periodical servants of the people, is an
aristocracy, a monarchy, and a despotism.
PUBLIUS. |
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