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Federalist
No. 74
The Command of the Military
and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the
Executive
From the New York Packet Tuesday, March 25, 1788. |
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Author: Alexander Hamilton
To the People of the State of New York:
THE President of the United States is to be ``commander-in-chief
of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of
the several States WHEN CALLED INTO THE ACTUAL SERVICE of the
United States.'' The propriety of this provision is so evident
in itself, and it is, at the same time, so consonant to the
precedents of the State constitutions in general, that little
need be said to explain or enforce it. Even those of them which
have, in other respects, coupled the chief magistrate with a
council, have for the most part concentrated the military
authority in him alone. Of all the cares or concerns of
government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those
qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single
hand. The direction of war implies the direction of the common
strength; and the power of directing and employing the common
strength, forms a usual and essential part in the definition of
the executive authority.
``The President may require the opinion, in writing, of the
principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any
subject relating to the duties of their respective officers.''
This I consider as a mere redundancy in the plan, as the right
for which it provides would result of itself from the office.
He is also to be authorized to grant ``reprieves and pardons for
offenses against the United States, EXCEPT IN CASES OF
IMPEACHMENT.'' Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate,
that the benign prerogative of pardoning should be as little as
possible fettered or embarrassed. The criminal code of every
country partakes so much of necessary severity, that without an
easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice
would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel. As the sense
of responsibility is always strongest, in proportion as it is
undivided, it may be inferred that a single man would be most
ready to attend to the force of those motives which might plead
for a mitigation of the rigor of the law, and least apt to yield
to considerations which were calculated to shelter a fit object
of its vengeance. The reflection that the fate of a
fellow-creature depended on his sole fiat, would naturally
inspire scrupulousness and caution; the dread of being accused
of weakness or connivance, would beget equal circumspection,
though of a different kind. On the other hand, as men generally
derive confidence from their numbers, they might often encourage
each other in an act of obduracy, and might be less sensible to
the apprehension of suspicion or censure for an injudicious or
affected clemency. On these accounts, one man appears to be a
more eligible dispenser of the mercy of government, than a body
of men.
The expediency of vesting the power of pardoning in the
President has, if I mistake not, been only contested in relation
to the crime of treason. This, it has been urged, ought to have
depended upon the assent of one, or both, of the branches of the
legislative body. I shall not deny that there are strong reasons
to be assigned for requiring in this particular the concurrence
of that body, or of a part of it. As treason is a crime levelled
at the immediate being of the society, when the laws have once
ascertained the guilt of the offender, there seems a fitness in
referring the expediency of an act of mercy towards him to the
judgment of the legislature. And this ought the rather to be the
case, as the supposition of the connivance of the Chief
Magistrate ought not to be entirely excluded. But there are also
strong objections to such a plan. It is not to be doubted, that
a single man of prudence and good sense is better fitted, in
delicate conjunctures, to balance the motives which may plead
for and against the remission of the punishment, than any
numerous body whatever. It deserves particular attention, that
treason will often be connected with seditions which embrace a
large proportion of the community; as lately happened in
Massachusetts. In every such case, we might expect to see the
representation of the people tainted with the same spirit which
had given birth to the offense. And when parties were pretty
equally matched, the secret sympathy of the friends and favorers
of the condemned person, availing itself of the good-nature and
weakness of others, might frequently bestow impunity where the
terror of an example was necessary. On the other hand, when the
sedition had proceeded from causes which had inflamed the
resentments of the major party, they might often be found
obstinate and inexorable, when policy demanded a conduct of
forbearance and clemency. But the principal argument for
reposing the power of pardoning in this case to the Chief
Magistrate is this: in seasons of insurrection or rebellion,
there are often critical moments, when a welltimed offer of
pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquillity
of the commonwealth; and which, if suffered to pass unimproved,
it may never be possible afterwards to recall. The dilatory
process of convening the legislature, or one of its branches,
for the purpose of obtaining its sanction to the measure, would
frequently be the occasion of letting slip the golden
opportunity. The loss of a week, a day, an hour, may sometimes
be fatal. If it should be observed, that a discretionary power,
with a view to such contingencies, might be occasionally
conferred upon the President, it may be answered in the first
place, that it is questionable, whether, in a limited
Constitution, that power could be delegated by law; and in the
second place, that it would generally be impolitic beforehand to
take any step which might hold out the prospect of impunity. A
proceeding of this kind, out of the usual course, would be
likely to be construed into an argument of timidity or of
weakness, and would have a tendency to embolden guilt.
PUBLIUS. |
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