Author: Alexander Hamilton
To the People of the State of New York:
THE President is to have power, ``by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of
the senators present concur.''
Though this provision has been assailed, on different grounds,
with no small degree of vehemence, I scruple not to declare my
firm persuasion, that it is one of the best digested and most
unexceptionable parts of the plan. One ground of objection is
the trite topic of the intermixture of powers; some contending
that the President ought alone to possess the power of making
treaties; others, that it ought to have been exclusively
deposited in the Senate. Another source of objection is derived
from the small number of persons by whom a treaty may be made.
Of those who espouse this objection, a part are of opinion that
the House of Representatives ought to have been associated in
the business, while another part seem to think that nothing more
was necessary than to have substituted two thirds of ALL the
members of the Senate, to two thirds of the members PRESENT. As
I flatter myself the observations made in a preceding number
upon this part of the plan must have sufficed to place it, to a
discerning eye, in a very favorable light, I shall here content
myself with offering only some supplementary remarks,
principally with a view to the objections which have been just
stated.
With regard to the intermixture of powers, I shall rely upon the
explanations already given in other places, of the true sense of
the rule upon which that objection is founded; and shall take it
for granted, as an inference from them, that the union of the
Executive with the Senate, in the article of treaties, is no
infringement of that rule. I venture to add, that the particular
nature of the power of making treaties indicates a peculiar
propriety in that union. Though several writers on the subject
of government place that power in the class of executive
authorities, yet this is evidently an arbitrary disposition; for
if we attend carefully to its operation, it will be found to
partake more of the legislative than of the executive character,
though it does not seem strictly to fall within the definition
of either of them. The essence of the legislative authority is
to enact laws, or, in other words, to prescribe rules for the
regulation of the society; while the execution of the laws, and
the employment of the common strength, either for this purpose
or for the common defense, seem to comprise all the functions of
the executive magistrate. The power of making treaties is,
plainly, neither the one nor the other. It relates neither to
the execution of the subsisting laws, nor to the enaction of new
ones; and still less to an exertion of the common strength. Its
objects are CONTRACTS with foreign nations, which have the force
of law, but derive it from the obligations of good faith. They
are not rules prescribed by the sovereign to the subject, but
agreements between sovereign and sovereign. The power in
question seems therefore to form a distinct department, and to
belong, properly, neither to the legislative nor to the
executive. The qualities elsewhere detailed as indispensable in
the management of foreign negotiations, point out the Executive
as the most fit agent in those transactions; while the vast
importance of the trust, and the operation of treaties as laws,
plead strongly for the participation of the whole or a portion
of the legislative body in the office of making them.
However proper or safe it may be in governments where the
executive magistrate is an hereditary monarch, to commit to him
the entire power of making treaties, it would be utterly unsafe
and improper to intrust that power to an elective magistrate of
four years' duration. It has been remarked, upon another
occasion, and the remark is unquestionably just, that an
hereditary monarch, though often the oppressor of his people,
has personally too much stake in the government to be in any
material danger of being corrupted by foreign powers. But a man
raised from the station of a private citizen to the rank of
chief magistrate, possessed of a moderate or slender fortune,
and looking forward to a period not very remote when he may
probably be obliged to return to the station from which he was
taken, might sometimes be under temptations to sacrifice his
duty to his interest, which it would require superlative virtue
to withstand. An avaricious man might be tempted to betray the
interests of the state to the acquisition of wealth. An
ambitious man might make his own aggrandizement, by the aid of a
foreign power, the price of his treachery to his constituents.
The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted
opinion of human virtue which would make it wise in a nation to
commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those
which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world, to the
sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as would
be a President of the United States.
To have intrusted the power of making treaties to the Senate
alone, would have been to relinquish the benefits of the
constitutional agency of the President in the conduct of foreign
negotiations. It is true that the Senate would, in that case,
have the option of employing him in this capacity, but they
would also have the option of letting it alone, and pique or
cabal might induce the latter rather than the former. Besides
this, the ministerial servant of the Senate could not be
expected to enjoy the confidence and respect of foreign powers
in the same degree with the constitutional representatives of
the nation, and, of course, would not be able to act with an
equal degree of weight or efficacy. While the Union would, from
this cause, lose a considerable advantage in the management of
its external concerns, the people would lose the additional
security which would result from the co-operation of the
Executive. Though it would be imprudent to confide in him solely
so important a trust, yet it cannot be doubted that his
participation would materially add to the safety of the society.
It must indeed be clear to a demonstration that the joint
possession of the power in question, by the President and
Senate, would afford a greater prospect of security, than the
separate possession of it by either of them. And whoever has
maturely weighed the circumstances which must concur in the
appointment of a President, will be satisfied that the office
will always bid fair to be filled by men of such characters as
to render their concurrence in the formation of treaties
peculiarly desirable, as well on the score of wisdom, as on that
of integrity.
The remarks made in a former number, which have been alluded to
in another part of this paper, will apply with conclusive force
against the admission of the House of Representatives to a share
in the formation of treaties. The fluctuating and, taking its
future increase into the account, the multitudinous composition
of that body, forbid us to expect in it those qualities which
are essential to the proper execution of such a trust. Accurate
and comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; a steady and
systematic adherence to the same views; a nice and uniform
sensibility to national character; decision, SECRECY, and
despatch, are incompatible with the genius of a body so variable
and so numerous. The very complication of the business, by
introducing a necessity of the concurrence of so many different
bodies, would of itself afford a solid objection. The greater
frequency of the calls upon the House of Representatives, and
the greater length of time which it would often be necessary to
keep them together when convened, to obtain their sanction in
the progressive stages of a treaty, would be a source of so
great inconvenience and expense as alone ought to condemn the
project.
The only objection which remains to be canvassed, is that which
would substitute the proportion of two thirds of all the members
composing the senatorial body, to that of two thirds of the
members PRESENT. It has been shown, under the second head of our
inquiries, that all provisions which require more than the
majority of any body to its resolutions, have a direct tendency
to embarrass the operations of the government, and an indirect
one to subject the sense of the majority to that of the
minority. This consideration seems sufficient to determine our
opinion, that the convention have gone as far in the endeavor to
secure the advantage of numbers in the formation of treaties as
could have been reconciled either with the activity of the
public councils or with a reasonable regard to the major sense
of the community. If two thirds of the whole number of members
had been required, it would, in many cases, from the
non-attendance of a part, amount in practice to a necessity of
unanimity. And the history of every political establishment in
which this principle has prevailed, is a history of impotence,
perplexity, and disorder. Proofs of this position might be
adduced from the examples of the Roman Tribuneship, the Polish
Diet, and the States-General of the Netherlands, did not an
example at home render foreign precedents unnecessary.
To require a fixed proportion of the whole body would not, in
all probability, contribute to the advantages of a numerous
agency, better then merely to require a proportion of the
attending members. The former, by making a determinate number at
all times requisite to a resolution, diminishes the motives to
punctual attendance. The latter, by making the capacity of the
body to depend on a PROPORTION which may be varied by the
absence or presence of a single member, has the contrary effect.
And as, by promoting punctuality, it tends to keep the body
complete, there is great likelihood that its resolutions would
generally be dictated by as great a number in this case as in
the other; while there would be much fewer occasions of delay.
It ought not to be forgotten that, under the existing
Confederation, two members MAY, and usually DO, represent a
State; whence it happens that Congress, who now are solely
invested with ALL THE POWERS of the Union, rarely consist of a
greater number of persons than would compose the intended
Senate. If we add to this, that as the members vote by States,
and that where there is only a single member present from a
State, his vote is lost, it will justify a supposition that the
active voices in the Senate, where the members are to vote
individually, would rarely fall short in number of the active
voices in the existing Congress. When, in addition to these
considerations, we take into view the co-operation of the
President, we shall not hesitate to infer that the people of
America would have greater security against an improper use of
the power of making treaties, under the new Constitution, than
they now enjoy under the Confederation. And when we proceed
still one step further, and look forward to the probable
augmentation of the Senate, by the erection of new States, we
shall not only perceive ample ground of confidence in the
sufficiency of the members to whose agency that power will be
intrusted, but we shall probably be led to conclude that a body
more numerous than the Senate would be likely to become, would
be very little fit for the proper discharge of the trust.
PUBLIUS. |